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In this brief technical report we sketch a semantics for first-order logic with
generalized quantifiers based on double teams. We also define the notion of
a generalized atom. Such atoms can be used in order to define extensions of
first-order logic with a team-based semantics. We then briefly discuss how our
double team semantics relates to game semantics based approaches to extensions
of first-order logic with generalized quantifiers.
1 Introduction
While the role of team semantics in IF logic [2] and dependence logic [3] is well
known, team semantics should also be studied for its own sake.
Engstro¨m investigates generalized quantifiers in the context of team seman-
tics in [1]. In that article, the scope of admissible generalized quantifiers is
limited. In this short technical report we define a natural semantics based on
double teams that works fine with any extension of first-order logic with a col-
lection of generalized quantifiers.
We also consider extensions of first-order logic with generalized atoms. These
are devices that can be used in order to declare properties that double teams
must satisfy. While a sequence x1, ..., xn of variables and a team give rise to
an n-ary relation, a double team and two sequences of variables give rise to
a pair of relations. With a generalized atom, one can assert that the pair of
relations must satisfy some property. For example, an atom could assert that
the first relation has some finite number k of tuples, while the other relation
has 2k tuples.
We also briefly discuss the connection between team-based systems and
game-theoretic approaches to semantics, and address some issues concerning
possible applications of team semantics and logic in general.
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2 A Double Team Semantics
Let N+ denote the set of positive natural numbers, and let VAR = {xi | i ∈ N+}
be the set of exactly all first-order variable symbols. We shall occasionally use
metavariables x, y, z instead of symbols xi ∈ VAR in order to simplify notation.
Let X ⊆ VAR be a finite, possibly empty set. Let A be a model with the
domain A. We always assume that A 6= ∅. A function f : X −→ A is called a
variable assignment for the model A.
By x we denote a finite nonempty tuple of variable symbols, i.e., a tuple in
VARn for some n ∈ N+. We also use y, z, x1, x2, etc., to refer to finite nonempty
tuples of variable symbols.
Let a be a finite nonempty tuple. We let a(k) denote the k-th member of
the tuple. When we write u ∈ a, we mean that u is a member of the tuple a,
i.e., if a = (a1, ..., an), then u ∈ a iff u ∈ {a1, ..., an}. If f is a function mapping
into some set Sk of tuples of the length k ∈ N+, then fi denotes a function with
the same domain as f and defined such that
fi(x) =
(
f(x)
)
(i),
i.e., fi is the i-th coordinate function of f , and therefore fi(x) is the i-th coor-
dinate value of f(x).
Let s be a variable assignment with the domain X and for the model A. Let
x ∈ VARn be a tuple of variables and a ∈ An a tuple of the same length as x. We
let s[x/a] denote the variable assignment for A with the domain X∪{ x | x ∈ x }
defined as follows.
1. s[x/a](y) = a(k) if y = x(k),
2. s[x/a](y) = s(y) if y 6∈ x.
Let T ⊆ P(An), where P denotes the power set operator. We define
s[x/T ] = { s[x/a ] | a ∈ T }.
Note that s[x, ∅ ] = ∅.
Let X ⊆ VAR be a finite, possibly empty set of first-order variable symbols.
Let U be a set of variable assignments f : X −→ A. Such a set U is a team
with the domain X for the model A. Note that the empty set is a team for A,
as is the set {∅} containing only the empty variable assignment. The domain
X associated with the empty team is not unique.
Let V be a nonempty team with the domain X for the model A. Let n ∈ N+,
and let f : V −→ P(An) be a function. We write
V [x/f ] =
⋃
s∈V
s[x/f(s) ].
If V = ∅, i.e., V is the empty team, then V [x/f ] = ∅.
Let n ∈ N+. If f : V −→ P(An) is a function, then f ′ : V −→ P(An)
denotes the function defined such f ′(s) = An \ f(s) for all s ∈ V . Below when
applying the notation f ′, the set An and the function f are always known from
the context, so there is no ambiguity related to the definition of f ′.
Let (i1, ..., in) be a non-empty sequence of positive integers. A generalized
quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in) is a class C of structures (A,B1, ..., Bn) such
that the following conditions hold.
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1. A 6= ∅.
2. For each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, we have Bj ⊆ Aij .
3. If (A′, B′1, ..., B
′
n) ∈ C and if there is an isomorphism f : A′ −→ A′′
from (A′, B′1, ..., B
′
n) to another structure (A
′′, B′′1 , ..., B
′′
n), then we have
(A′′, B′′1 , ..., B
′′
n) ∈ C.
Let Q be a generalized quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in). We let Q denote
the generalized quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in) defined such that
Q = { (A,C1, ..., Cn) | (A,C1, ..., Cn) 6∈ Q }.
Let A be a model with the domain A. We define QA to be the class
{ (B1, ..., Bn) | (A,B1, ..., Bn) ∈ Q }.
Similarly, we define
Q
A
= { (B1, ..., Bn) | (A,B1, ..., Bn) ∈ Q }.
Below we shall define a semantics based on ordered sets of teams. Going
this step higher from teams to ordered sets of teams enables a flexible way of
encoding information that will be used in order to define a natural team-based
semantics for first-order logic extended with generalized quantifiers. In fact,
in the investigations below, we shall concentrate on double teams, i.e., ordered
pairs of teams. In ordinary team semantics for ordinary first-order logic, the
background intuition is that a team satisfies a formula iff every member of the
team satisfies it. In the double team semantics, the background intuition is that
a double team (U, V ) satisfies a first-order formula iff every assignment in the
team U satisfies it, and furthermore, every assignment in the team V falsifies
the formula. Therefore, the set set of witnesses for a quantified formula Qxϕ(x)
has to be the set of exactly all values a such that ϕ(a) holds. A subset will not
do. This is the main intuition behind the systems of team semantics and game
semantics below.
The definition for atoms and connectives is as follows.
A, (U, V ) |= t1 = t2 ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO t1 = t2
)
and
∀s ∈ V (A, s 6|=FO t1 = t2).
A, (U, V ) |= R(t1, ..., tm) ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO R(t1, ..., tm)
)
and
∀s ∈ V (A, s 6|=FO R(t1, ..., tm)).
A, (U, V ) |= ¬ϕ ⇔ A, (V,U) |= ϕ.
A, (U, V ) |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ A, (U1, V ) |= ϕ and A, (U2, V ) |= ψ
for some teams U1 and U2 such that
U = U1 ∪ U2.
For a generalized quantifier Q of the type (i1, ..., in), we define
A, (U, V ) |= Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
if and only if there exists a function f : U −→ QA such that
A,
(
U [x1/f1], U [x1/f1
′ ]
) |= ϕ1,
...
A,
(
U [xn/fn], U [xn/fn
′ ]
) |= ϕn,
3
and there exists a function g : V −→ QA such that
A,
(
V [x1/g1], V [x1/g1
′ ]
) |= ϕ1,
...
A,
(
V [xn/gn], V [xn/gn
′ ]
) |= ϕn.
Proposition 2.1. Let ϕ be a formula of first-order logic, possibly extended with
generalized quantifiers. Let (U, V ) be a double team. Then
A, (U, V ) |= ϕ iff ∀s ∈ U∀t ∈ V (A, s |=FO ϕ and A, t 6|=FO ϕ
)
.
Proof. The claim of the proposition is established by a straightforward induction
on the structure of formulae.
3 Generalized Atoms and Operators
Let V be a team with the domain X for the model A, and let k ∈ N+. Let
t1, ..., tk be terms whose constant and function symbols are part of the vocab-
ulary of A, and assume that X contains all variable symbols that occur in the
terms. Define
Rel
(
A, V, (t1, ..., tk)
)
= { (s(t1), ..., s(tk)) | s ∈ V },
where s extends to interpret terms with constant and function symbols in the
obvious way. If V is empty, then the obtained relation is the empty relation.
Let n,m ∈ N such that n + m > 0. Let Q be a generalized quantifier
of the type (i1, ..., in+m). Extend the syntax of first-order logic with atomic
expressions of the type
AQ,n(t1, ..., tn ; tn+1, ..., tn+m),
where each tj is a tuple of terms of the length ij .
Extend the double team semantics such that
A, (U, V ) |= AQ,n(t1, ..., tn ; tn+1, ..., tn+m)
if and only if(
Rel(U,A, t1), ...,Rel(U,A, tn),Rel(V,A, tn+1), ...,Rel(V,A, tn+m)
) ∈ QA.
The generalized quantifier Q and the number n define a generalized atom AQ,n
of the type (
(i1, ..., in), (in+1, ..., in+m)
)
.
Note that types of generalized quantifiers are tuples and types of generalized
atoms are pairs of tuples.
Generalized atoms with one part for positive information and another for
negative information can be used in order to define double team based logics
with natural duality properties. In addition to generalized atoms, one can also
consider generalized connectives in the team based higher order setting. We shall
give a functional definition of a framework where one can easily and relatively
canonically define various kinds of natural higher order operators.
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In the rest of this section, a model is a tuple (S, P1, ..., Pn), where S is a set
and Pi are predicates interpreted as subsets of S, i.e., Pi ⊆ S. Also an infinite
set of predicates could be considered. Define the language
ϕ ::= Pi | (ϕ ∨ ψ) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ∨ψ) | ¬ϕ,
where Pi are predicates. (We shall not differentiate between predicates and
predicate symbols here.)
Define the following.
||Pi|| = { V ⊆ S | V ⊆ Pi },
||(ϕ ∨ ψ)|| = { V ⊆ S | V = V1 ∪ V2 for some V1 ∈ ||ϕ|| and V2 ∈ ||ψ|| },
||¬ϕ|| = { V ⊆ S | for all U ∈ ||ϕ||, V ⊆ (S \ U) },
||(ϕ∨ψ)|| = ||ϕ|| ∪ ||ψ||,
||¬ϕ|| = P(S) \ ||ϕ||.
In this setting we are considering logic over a collection S of worlds w ∈ S
(or states or whatever objects w ∈ S). We have local connectives ∨ and ¬ and
global connectives ∨ and ¬. We define that ϕ is valid in U ⊆ S iff U ∈ ||ϕ||.
For example commutativity is not valid in the class of groups but is valid in the
class of Abelian groups. We can also define, for example, that that ϕ is true in
w ∈ S iff {w} ∈ ||ϕ||.
We can extend this logic by generalized operators. A generalized operator
f of the arity n ∈ N is a mapping such that for each model with domain S
and sets U1, ..., Un ⊆ P(S), the map returns a set U ⊆ P(S). Furthermore,
f is closed under isomorphisms: Let (S,U1, ..., Un) and (T, V1, ..., Vn) be tuples
such that conditions U1, ..., Un ⊆ P(S) and V1, ..., Vn ⊆ P(T ) hold. Here S
and T are arbitrary sets. If some bijection g : S → T satisfies g(Ui) = Vi for
all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, then we have g(f(S,U1, ...Un)) = f(T, V1, ..., Vn). Obviously,
semantics for the formula f(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) is defined such that
||f(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)|| = f(||ϕ1||, ..., ||ϕn||).
The logic defined above resembles team logic [3] and modal dependence
logic [4]. Both of those systems have problems with the nesting of operators.
There are no such problems in the above framework. Also, the framework works
rather smoothly without the use of normal forms. This is holds for double team
semantics too.
It would be natural to extend the above logic by higher order predicates
P i denoting subsets of P(S) rather than subsets of S. One could also consider
connectives for further levels of the power set hierarchy. Also, it would be an
interesting excercise to investigate what kind of a degree of canonicity the above
semantics has.
The functional semantics given above can of course be done in the setting
of first-order logic as well. Essentially this involves operators that output a set
of assignments on the input of a tuple of sets of assignments. This is because
in the setting of standard first-order logic, the extension of a first-order formula
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(in a fixed model) is the set of assignments satisfying the formula. This all
leads naturally to Scott-Montague semantics, general compositional semantics,
and issues concerning cylindric set algebras. Of course also operators on sets of
teams can be considered, if desired.
4 Team vs. Game Semantics
Let A be a model with the domain A. Consider first-order logic with a collection
Q of generalized quantifiers of the type (1). Let f be an assignment function
mapping a finite set of first-order variable symbols into A. We define a semantic
game (A, ϕ, f, ∗), where ∗ ∈ {I, II}, between two players I and II. Here we
assume that the assignment f interprets all the free variables in ϕ.
If a position (A, ψ, g, ∗) is reached, where ψ is an atomic formula, then ∗
wins the game if A, g |=FO ψ. If A, g 6|=FO ψ, then player ∗ ∈ {I, II} \ {∗} wins
the game.
Assume we have reached the position (A,¬ψ, g, ∗) in the game. The game
continues from the position (A, ψ, g, ∗). If a position (A, ψ ∨ψ′, g, ∗) is reached,
The player ∗ chooses a formula χ ∈ {ψ,ψ′}, and the game continues from the
position (A, χ, g, ∗).
Assume we have reached the position (A, Qxψ, g, ∗) in the game. The game
continues as follows.
1. The player ∗ chooses a set S ∈ QA. The intuition is that the player ∗
claims that S is the set of exactly all values that witness ψ.
2. The player ∗ chooses either the set S or its complement A \ S.
(a) If ∗ chooses S, then ∗ also chooses an element s ∈ S, and the game
continues from the position (A, ψ, g[x/s], ∗). In this case the intuition
is that the player ∗ is opposing the claim that s verifies ψ. (If S = ∅
and the player ∗ chooses S, the player ∗ looses the game.)
(b) If ∗ chooses A \ S, then ∗ also chooses an element s ∈ A \ S. The
game continues from the position (A, ψ, g[x/s], ∗). In this case the
player ∗ becomes the verifier in the game. The intuition is that the
player ∗ is opposing the claim that s falsifies ψ. (If A \ S = ∅ and
the player ∗ chooses A \ S, the player ∗ looses.)
This is a conservative semantics for first-order logic with generalized quan-
tifiers (of the type (1) in this case, for the sake of simplicity). In some sense,
game semantics can be regarded as a fundamental system of semantics linking a
language to its action-based acquisition process. Team semantics is a mathemat-
ical tool for keeping track of game histories. It would be an interesting exercise
to attempt to identify a general and canonical translation of (not necessarily
logic-related) game-based systems to team-based ones, i.e., ones that keep track
of possible game histories. The game-based and team-based semantics defined
above, or their close variants, could probably be canonically linked in this way.
It is easy to define natural variants of the above systems of semantics. In
the game semantics above, quantifiers are treated in a maximal fashion: the
verifying player must choose exactly all members in the domain that witness
the quantified formula. One could do the analogous thing with connectives:
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at a position for ψ ∨ ψ′, the verifying player would have to choose exactly the
subset of {ψ,ψ′} of formulae that are true, and that subset would have to be
nonempty. The opposing player would then choose a formula either from the
set chosen by the verifier or its complement set. A choice from the complement
set would result in a switch of roles. Also, the disjunction clause of the double
team semantics can easily be seen to allow for alternative definitions.
5 Concluding Remarks
Team semantics is a second-order semantics for first-order languages. It is
second-order in the sense that instead of considering single assignments, as
in the traditional semantics, it considers sets of assignments. However, team
semantics is conservative with respect to traditional Tarskian semantics on or-
dinary first-order formulae. Indeed, it is a good question what can be achieved
by introducing a system of semantics that generalizes some traditional system
in some conservative way. This is one of the interesting points of team seman-
tics. It is a natural way of generalizing classical first-order semantics, and it
naturally links the game-theoretical semantics of first-order logic with Tarskian
semantics.
Above we have studied a double team semantics for first-order logic with
generalized quantifiers. It is an intriguing question what could be achieved by
considering a semantics based on, say, ordered sets of teams, or sets of ordered
sets of teams, etc. While such questions can appear undermotivated, they can be
regarded as basic research in logic not motivated by applications; basic research
of logic hardly seems unimportant when reflected against the development of
modern science in general. Even though not directly related to team semantics,
let us digress to briefly discuss possible uses of logic and different systems of
semantics in future scientific contexts.
Today, physics is an impressive, huge body of statements, described mostly
in an informal mathematical language. Theories are informal. Axiomatized
ones are mainly informally axiomatized, i.e., it is often not quite clear what
the background formal language would be, and what the signature —if any—
in that language would be. Furthermore, having some exact axiomatization
is one thing, but one can also ask how relevant a particular axiomatization
is. Let us consider a situation where we have a sensible, decidable theory1
T of some system of science. From the point of view of being able to access
assertions of theories, this is better than having an undecidable theory. So, T
is an accessible theory. However, assume that the complexity of T is very high.
Assume we have another theory, T ′ ⊆ T , describing the same phenomenon as
T , and assume that T ′ is of a lower complexity.2 Assume that both T and T ′
are non-trivial theories describing our system. Now, neither one of the theories
is in any obvious sense better than the other one. There remains a trade-off
between information content and the speed of use. And, in addition to speed
issues, there are rather fundamental qualitative differences between decidable
theories, undecidable but recursively enumerable theories, and theories that are
1By a theory we mean simply a set of formulae; no closure under consequence is assumed
here.
2This is always possible, consider the theory {∀x(x = x)}, for example.
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not even recursively enumerable.3 The traditional approach to science still does
not worry much about such issues. Ultimately these kinds of questions will be
faced. Then the naive approach, where a single theory is being built, will not
suffice. Then formal logic and informatics can help.
When decidability is not required, ZFC is, of course, one currently paradig-
matic axiom system within which various different systems can be easily inter-
preted. The theoremhood of ZFC is recursively enumerable, and the system has
a kind of a verification property: if ϕ is a theorem of ZFC, then it has a finite,
formal proof using only ZFC axioms together with primitives of some first-order
proof system. Once we know a formal proof of a theorem ϕ of ZFC, then, to
question ϕ, one must question ZFC axioms or primitives of our first-order proof
system. Therefore, ϕ is, in a sense, relatively strongly verified. Therefore, by
staying in ZFC, one eliminates a lot of philosophical worry. The formal system
is, on the formal level, or in itself, discrete, clear and finitary in a relatively
strong sense.
However, the theoremhood of ZFC is not decidable, and there is also the
independence phenomenon associated with this system. Let us finish our little
digression by briefly discussing the independence issue.
So, there exist formulae ϕ such that ZFC 6` ϕ and ZFC 6` ¬ϕ, assuming
consistency. There are formulae whose truth the formal system does not decide.
However, it is another matter how independence of some formula ϕ should
be interpreted. For example, it is straightforward to construct a computable
reduction F from a set of formal specifications of Turing machines to first-order
logic such that machine M halts on the empty input iff ZFC ` F (M).4 There is
then, of course, some machine M ′ such that ZFC 6` F (M ′) and ZFC 6` ¬F (M ′).
The machine M ′ does not halt on the empty input. One can ask whether halting
of M ′ is undecided by ZFC on some fundamental level. It is true that ZFC 6`
F (M ′) and ZFC 6` ¬F (M ′), but one can define a new, computable reduction F ′
such that for each machine M , M halts on the empty input iff ZFC ` F ′(M),
and furthermore, ZFC ` ¬F ′(M ′). This is always possible by simply defining
F ′(M) := F (M) for all M except for M ′, and F ′(M ′) := ¬∀x(x = x). Of course
one may then claim that our new reduction F ′ is not canonical or natural in
some sense. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that we have, simply by
observing the specification of M ′, directly concluded that this machine does
not halt on the empty input, and therefore decided to define a map F ′ that
maps M ′ directly to ¬∀x(x = x). While independence of the formal statement
F (M ′) of the axioms of ZFC is unquestionable, we may ask what the meta-
level implication of that formal fact really is. One can always wonder what the
canonical formalization of an unformalized assertion should be, and why. In the
absence of the Axiom of Choice, Dedekind infinity and infinity based on natural
numbers provide a striking example of a pair of non-equivalent formalizations
of the same meta-level concept.
Independence of a statement and its negation implies that in some sense the
system described is not fully specified. This can be regarded as a flaw. However,
often a perfectly sensible approach can be based on the background assumption
that the theoremhood of an object of reflection should not be determinate in the
3It should also be noted that currently standard complexity measures do not always nec-
essarily directly reflect complexity phenomena faced in real-life situations.
4It is very easy to construct a natural map F when one allows for more predicate symbols
than ∈.
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first place. In a possible context of informal mathematics, we could suddenly
be faced with the question whether ∀x(x 6∈ x) holds.5 Then, an anti-realist
could claim that since the notion of a set is not intersubjectively determined
well enough, we do not have ∀x(x 6∈ x). Could we then conclude that therefore,
since we do not have ∀x(x 6∈ x), we have ¬∀x(x 6∈ x)? One should now ask what
the precise meanings of the related claims are. The logic introduced in Section
3 provides a framework for related investigations, with the set of worlds being
interpreted as the class C of all {∈}-models. Some proper subclass T of C is
interpreted as the set of all acceptable models of set theory. Let ∀(x 6∈ x) be a
predicate symbol in the related framework, interpreted to be true in those worlds
of C where x connects to itself via the relation ∈. If we accept that ∀x(x 6∈ x) is
not valid in T , we can easily accept that ¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid in T . Continuing
the use of the connectives of Section 3, we do not necessarily have to accept
that ¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid in T . Similarly, if we accept that neither ∀x(x 6∈ x) nor
¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid in T , we do not have to accept that ∀x(x 6∈ x)∨¬∀x(x 6∈ x)
is not valid in T , but we can quite easily accept that ∀x(x 6∈ x)∨¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is
not valid in T , and that therefore ¬(∀x(x 6∈ x)∨¬∀x(x 6∈ x)) is valid in T . Also,
∀x(x 6∈ x)∨¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid in T , and so is ∀x(x 6∈ x) ∨ ¬∀x(x 6∈ x).6 It
is indeed a tempting idea to keep connectives Boolean and use modal operators
to talk about modes of validity (and satisfiability).
Questions concerning the excluded middle are interesting indeed, and prob-
lems with mathematical realism can appear quite real. The notion of definition
is central in this context. Everybody is familiar with situations where some
novel, intuitively relatively clear notion is used, but still, the notion is not com-
pletely fixed and opinions about its precise canonical properties can differ from
person to person. Such situations exist in mathematical practise, and one may
wonder whether less novel mathematical notions should be immune to vague-
ness in the twilight zone? Is there a real qualitative difference here? Are human
cognitive mechanisms so uniform, that there always exists exactly one canonical
outcome of a sufficiently clearly initiated notion construction process?7 Realist
perspectives can feel dubious, but obviously anti-realist perspectives have their
problems as well. And so do hybrid perspectives. For example, sometimes one
hears about realism concerning arithmetic and simultaneous anti-realism con-
cerning sets. This kind of a hybrid perspective appears problematic for example
when higher order languages are used in order to talk about arithmetic. The
talk can really be more about sets there.
5This is of course a theorem of ZFC.
6Without care one could be fooled into concluding from the two premises asserting that
neither ∀x(x 6∈ x) nor ¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid, that therefore—by the first premise— the formula
¬∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid, and by the second premise ∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid, and hence ¬∀x(x 6∈
x) ∧ ∀x(x 6∈ x) is valid.
7Most mathematicians would consider the role of the Axiom of Union in set theory rather
different from the role of the associative law in group theory. The first one is an axiom and the
second one part of a definition. Is the difference between definitions and axioms fundamental
or only a matter of degree? Something as fundamental as the universal quantifier could at
least conceivably be misunderstood to stand for some other quantifier that is equivalent to
∀ in restriction to models of size less that 21000. Perhaps somebody with rather unique
and unnecessarily complex cognitive faculties could conclude from his first sensible concrete
experiences that this is what “all” means. Or perhaps not really! But absolutely everything
can be plausibly argued for. And absolutely everything can be plausibly argued againts.
There is no limit to that! Too bad for those seeking rock-solid intellectual clarity, control and
stability.
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Usually in mathematics the implicit background assumption seems to be that
there is exactly one model within the framework of which the investigations are
carried out. Even when one is not ready to accept that all related notions are
completely specified (such as the notion of set), one usually still considers a
single, fixed (but not fully understood) background model. For example, when
defining the semantics of second-order logic, one usually asserts that M |= ¬ϕ iff
not M |= ϕ. This definition would lead to rather surprising issues if “not” was
to mean contradictory negation, as usual, and, for each formula χ, “M |= χ”
was to suddenly mean that χ is true no matter what interpretation of the notion
of set—out of some collection of acceptable background models— is meant. For
example, any formula that is supposed to assert the Continuum Hypothesis
can be considered in order to understand the questions that could arise here.
Above we have developed an approach to connectives that can elucidate logical
phenomena involving assertions about truth in a single model as well as validity
in a collection of models.
Different formal systems have different uses, strengths and weaknesses. A
theory T can have a higher information content than a related theory T ′, but T ′
may be of a lower complexity. Different approaches to semantics lead to different
kinds of logic-based investigations of formal systems. Viewing phenomena from
a variety of perspectives, rather than a single one, can be more fruitful and
delightful than insisting on a single orthodox approach. Team semantics is
an interesting extension of standard Tarskian semantics, and it also offers a
nice complementary perspective on the game-theoretic semantics of first-order
logic. In this article we have introduced a canonical double team semantics for
first-order logics with generalized quantifiers, and also defined the notion of a
generalized atom. It shall be interesting to see whether these considerations offer
a fruitful platform for future developments of systems based on team semantics.
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